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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this action are: 
1. Utah State Retirement Board, Plaintiff and Appellant. 
2. Badi Mahmood, Defendant and Respondent. 
3. Irene Woodside, Defendant. A default judgment was 
entered against Ms. Woodside on September 23, 1987. (R. 294-295) 
4. Dale Jackman, Defendant. Mr. Jackman was dismissed 
by Stipulation of the parties and Order of the District Court on 
March 11, 1987. (R. 148) 
5. Bara Investment Corporation, Defendant. Bara 
Investment Corporation was dismissed by Stipulation of the parties 
and Order of the District Court on April 4, 1986. (R. 175-177) 
6. National Housing and Finance Syndicate, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MAHMOOD 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of 78-2-2(3)(i) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant 
Mahmood's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's 
Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint in light of the court's 
ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed suit on December 11, 1985, against the 
named Defendants in five separate counts based upon various 
theories of fraud and misrepresentation. (R. 2-11) Thereafter, the 
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Defendants Barra and Jackman were dismissed from the suit upon 
Motion of the Plaintiff and order of the court. (R. 15-11, R. 148-
152) Plaintiff moved to amend its Complaint for the second time on 
April 8, 1987, (R. 155-170) , and after the filing of various 
motions and memorandums, the trial court entertained a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to File 
Second Amended Complaint. (R. 172-178, R. 269) 
After having taken the Motion for Summary Judgment under 
consideration, the trial court rendered its decision on May 13, 
1987, granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant National 
Housing, which ruling is set forth in the Minute Entry, (R. 269), 
and Judgment of the Court. (R. 272-275) Subsequently, Plaintiff 
and the Defendant Mahmood, by and through their respective counsel, 
stipulated to summary judgment in favor of the Defendant Mahmood as 
set forth in the Order of the court. (R. 272-275) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 18, 1979, an Earnest Money Agreement 
was executed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant National Housing 
and Finance Syndicate for the purchase of approximately 45 acres of 
undeveloped land located in the southeast quadrent of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, for a total consideration of $927,819. (R. 
229-230) 
Prior to the purchasing of the land, the Plaintiff 
requested an appraisal of the property by the Defendant Dale L. 
Jackman, MAI, which appraisal revealed the fair market value to be 
the sum of $950,000 (Exhibit 1A, William Chipman deposition, R. 
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180.) Thereafter, approximately a year subsequent to the sale and 
purchase date, the Plaintiff once again retained the services of 
John K. Bushnell, MAI, to furnish an "updated" appraisal of the 
subject property, which appraisal concluded the fair market value 
of the subject property to be the sum of $929,600 (Exhibit IB, 
William Chipman deposition, R. 181.) 
Subsequent to the appraisal conducted by John K. Bushnell, 
Salt Lake County adopted the "Salt Lake County Hillside Ordinance" 
which prohibited the construction of residential dwellings on 
slopes of 40% or greater, which precluded a substantial portion of 
the subject property from being developed (Exhibit IE and IF, 
William Chipman deposition, R. 181.) In addition to the hillside 
ordinance, real estate values in the Salt Lake County area have, 
since the date of sale, declined substantially (Exhibits 1G - 1H, 
William Chipman deposition, R. 181.) At no time has the Plaintiff 
claimed that the original appraisal conducted by Dale Jackman 
constituted fraud (Exhibit IB - 1L, William Chipman deposition, R. 
181.) As a matter of fact, the Plaintiff dismissed its claim 
against the Defendant Dale Jackman (Stipulation for Dismissal; 
William Chipman deposition, page 44; R. 151-158.) 
The only representations relied upon by the Plaintiff in 
arriving at its decision to purchase the land in question were 
those contained in the appraisal submitted by Dale Jackman 
(deposition of Russell Hales, page 6; R. 182.) 
In January, 1982, Plaintiff obtained an appraisal of the 
subject property which indicated the fair market value to be the 
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sum of $510,000 (Exhibit ID, William Chipman deposition, R. 182.) 
The Complaint in this action was filed on December 11, 1985; more 
than three years after the procurement of the 1982 appraisal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court having before it the depositions, 
memorandum of authorities, pleadings, and proposed pleadings 
concluded, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiff had failed to 
present any evidence that a cause of action on fraud or 
misrepresentation had been plead or could exist or that the alleged 
conduct had demonstrated any fraudulent act or misrepresentation. 
Therefore, the issue before this Court is whether or not the trial 
court had abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiff's Motion 
to amend its Complaint for the second time and determining, as a 
matter of law, that the Plaintiff had failed to present any 
material issues of fact which would preclude the granting of 
summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMITT ERROR IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT 
MAHMOOD AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
An analysis of the issues raised on appeal by the 
"Appellant's Brief" tends to indicate that the singular issue 
raised on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in denying 
the Plaintiff's Motion to file a Second Amended Complaint. 
However, after setting forth that proposition or issue, the 
Plaintiff then poses the issue of the statute of limitations and 
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the additional issue of a breach of fiduciary obligation. (Pages 
1-2 of "Appellant's Brief".) 
The principal objection posed by the Plaintiff is centered 
around the "Sixth Cause of Action" contained in the proposed Second 
Amended Complaint ("Appellant's Brief"f pages 11-12; R. 166-169.) 
The allegations of the original Complaint, (R. 2-10), and the 
allegations of the Amended Complaint, (R. 80-89), appear to contain 
the same identical claims of misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary 
obligation, mistake, and a general mish mash of assertions no 
different than those posed in the Second Amended Complaint. The 
only difference appears to be a different label attached with no 
new substantive issues plead or otherwise raised. 
The thrust of the Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 
179-190), focused upon the fact that the uncontroverted evidence 
before the trial court at the time of the hearing disclosed the 
following: 
1. Prior to the acquisition of the land by the Plaintiff, 
an independent appraisal had been obtained by the Plaintiff 
which disclosed the fair market value of the property in 
question to be the sum of $950,000 (Exhibit 1A, William 
Chipman deposition; page 6 of William Chipman deposition.) 
2. The Deputy Director and a member of the "Board" in 
charge of acquiring properties for the Plaintiff testified 
that prior to the acquisition of the property in question, 
he inspected the same in the presence of the Defendant 
Mahmood and that no representation was made concerning the 
value of same (Russell G. Hales deposition, page 5). 
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3. The appraisal of the property and the 
independent judgment of the "Board" were the 
factors which controlled in arriving at a decision 
relative to the purchase of the property (Russell 
G. Hales deposition, page 6.) 
Plaintiff concluded that the Defendant Jackman, who was the 
original appraiser involved in the acquisition of the premises, had 
not committed any fraud and dismissed Jackman from the action, 
(Stipulation of Dismissal, R. 150-151; William Chipman deposition, 
page 44.) 
In view of the pleadings, uncontroverted evidence, and 
testimony, the trial court properly concluded that no material 
issue of fact existed and that summary judgment should be granted, 
and further, that the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend its Complaint for 
the second time was rendered moot under the circumstances, (R. 
269-273-) 
In matters of this nature, it has generally been recognized 
that the ruling of the trial court will be sustained unless the 
discretionary power vested in the trial court has been abused. 
See: Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P2d 1286 (Ut., 1976); Peatross v. 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 P2d 281 (Ut., 1976); 
and, Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 663 P2d 93 (Ut., 
1983). 
As noted in the case of Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P2d 360 
(Ut., 1984), this Court held: 
"Although Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, tends to 
favor the granting of leave to amend, the matter remains in 
the sound discretion of the trial court." 
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It is widely recognized that the trial court has discretion 
to grant or deny the filing of an amended pleading and that when 
justice so requires, motions seeking to obtain such filing should 
be freely granted. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P2d 245, 248 (Ut., 
1983); Thomas J. Peck and Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 
515 P2d 446 (Ut., 1973); Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P2d 1045 (Ut., 
1971). However, in order to reverse the trial court's denial of 
the Plaintiff's motion, it must first be determined that the trial 
court abused its discretion or otherwise exercised its authority 
outside of reason to the extent as to be capricious or arbitrary. 
Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra. 
The proposed Second Amended Complaint considered in the 
light of the testimony elicited from the Plaintiff, taken together 
with the appraisals and other pertinent data, clearly indicates 
that said amendment would, in any event, be futile and would not 
survive a motion to dismiss, and therefore, the discretion and 
authority exercised by the trial court was entirely proper under 
the circumstances. 
A comparison of the contents of the proposed Second Amended 
Complaint, with the prior pleadings, clearly shows that no new 
issues have been raised and that the amendment of the pleading, if 
allowed, would be futile. It has been generally recognized that 
where a proposed amendment would be futile, the trial court may, 
within its discretion, deny a motion to amend such pleadings, or 
where the filing of such a proposed amendment would be frivolous or 
subject to a motion of dismissal, the court may exercise its sound 
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discretion and deny the same. See: Bache Halsey Stuart Shields v. 
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (D. Ut., 1983); 
Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P2d 89 (Colo., 1986); Burt v. Blue Shield of 
Southwest Ohio, 591 F. Suppl. 755 (S. D. Ohio, 1984). DeRoburt v. 
Gannett Co., 551 F. Supp. 973 (D. Hawaii 1982). 
In the Sixth Cause of Action of the proposed Second Amended 
Complaint, (R. 166-169), entitled "Constructive Fraud", the 
allegations contained therein merely embellish the allegations, 
claims, and contentions as set forth in the original Complaint and 
Amended Complaint, (R. 2-10, R. 80-89). 
The Plaintiff had every opportunity at the hearing on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment to present evidence, affidavits, or 
other proof in support of its claim, but for whatever reason, 
neglected to present any such evidence which would give rise to a 
claimed issue of material fact. 
As noted from the depositions cited herein and the 
pleadings, the Plaintiff authorized Dale Jackman to conduct an 
appraisal of the subject property as a condition to the purchase of 
same, (R. 180). Further, the appraisal by Mr. Jackman was 
submitted to the Plaintiff and constituted "the only 
representation" which the Board relied upon in arriving at its 
decision to purchase the property in question, (Deposition of 
Russell G. Hales, page 6; R. 182.) In view of the foregoing, one 
can readily understand why the Plaintiff was unable to present 
counter affidavits or other evidence which would refute the basis 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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As noted hereinabove, Mahmood1s participation in the 
activities prior to the acquisition of the property by the 
Plaintiff, as referred to hereinabove, was minimal, (Deposition of 
Russell G. Hales, Page 5.) At no place does the Plaintiff assert 
or claim that the Defendant Mahmood made any misrepresentation of 
value. 
It has been generally recognized that statements of the 
value of property are generally considered as declarations of 
opinion only and as such will not support an action for fraud, e.g. 
Poison Co. v. Imperial Cattle Co., 624 P2d 993, (Mont., 1981); Page 
Investment Co. v. Staley, 468 P2d 589, 591 (Ariz., 1970); 37 Am. 
Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, Section 119 at 164. 
In the case of Mackey v. Philzona Petroleum Co., 378 P2d 906 
(Ariz.), it was held: 
". . . . The accepted principle is that the power of 
avoidance for fraud or misrepresentation is lost if the 
injured party after having acquired knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the fraud, manifests to the other party an 
intention to affirm or exercises domination of things, 
restoration of which is a condition of his power of 
avoidance." 
In Page Investment Co., supra, it is cited: 
"Actionable fraud must be based upon a misrepresentation of 
material fact, and not upon an expression of opinion. 
(Authorities cited.) Here the alleged misrepresentation 
was only that 'the property was worth $7,500.00 per acre.1 
Such representation of value is generally simply a 
statement of opinion and not actionable as fraud." 
After the expiration of more than a year following the 
appraisal of the property by the Defendant Jackman, the Plaintiff 
secured a second appraisal from another independent appraiser by 
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the name of John K. Bushnell, who determined the fair market value 
of the subject property to be $929,600, (R. 181). It was only 
after the property experienced a substantial decline in value that 
the Plaintiff began to question the propriety of the purchase price 
paid for the premises in question and chose to ignore the fact that 
the compelling reasons for the decline in value were attributable 
to the enactment of the Salt Lake County Hillside Ordinance and the 
general decline in real estate values in the Salt Lake County area, 
(R. 181). 
Plaintiff's brief is replete with bare unsupported 
allegations totally unsupported by the record or any credible 
evidence or testimony, and in effect asks this Court to accept as 
proven fact the Plaintiff1s version of what they believe the 
evidence would be. 
In the case of Jardine v. Brunswick, 423 P2d 659 (Ut., 
1967), the Court stated: 
"'Where one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, 
is in a superior position to know material facts, and 
carelessly or negligently makes a false representation 
concerning them, expecting the other party to rely and act 
thereon, and the other party reasonably does so and suffers 
loss in that transaction, the representor can be held 
responsible if the other elements of fraud are also 
present.'" 
In applying the foregoing rule to the instant case, there 
does not exist a scintilla of evidence to show that the Defendant 
Mahmood made any false representation nor that the Plaintiff relied 
in any respect upon any act or ommission of said Defendant. To the 
contrary, the Plaintiff elected to argue the merits of the Motion 
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for Summary Judgment based upon the record at that time which 
clearly indicated that the only two elements which influenced or 
prompted the Plaintiff to purchase the property in question were 
the appraisal of the Defendant Dale Jackman and the "judgment of 
the Board". 
To sustain a claim of constructive fraud, it is essential 
that a confidential relationship is a prerequisite to the 
establishment of same and such relationship arises where one party 
having gained such trust and confidence of another has exercised 
extraordinary influence to bring about the damage or loss 
complained of. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P2d 766 (Ut., 1985). 
(See also Restatement of Torts, Second, Section 552.) In view of 
the testimony of Russell G. Hales and William Chipman, supra, the 
trial court, in our opinion, reached the only logical conclusion, 
to wit: "Plaintiff relied on the appraisal of Mr. Jackman who has 
been dismissed as a Defendant.", (R. 269). 
The evidence before the court at the hearing on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment indicated the nature and extent of Mahmood's 
participation to be that he had shown the property to the Plaintiff 
prior to its acquistion, but had made no representations with 
reference to its value, and beyond that point had taken no action 
in or otherwise participated in the procurement of the appraisal or 
the other deliberations conducted by the Plaintiff in arriving at a 
decision to purchase and acquire the property in question, (Russell 
G. Hales deposition, pages 5-6). 
We respectfully submit that the claim of constructive fraud 
requires the demonstration that extraordinary influences had been 
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used and that such influences have been a substantial and 
controlling factor in causing the aggrieved party to act thereon 
and to its detriment. 
It has been noted that "a trial court judgment will not be 
overturned if any theory within the pleadings and proof can support 
it." See: Setzer v. South Columbia Basin Irrigation District, 576 
P2d 82 (Wash., 1978); Lundgren v. Kieren, 393 P2d 625 (Wash., 1964) 
The Supreme Court of this State in the case of Franklin Financial 
v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P2d 1040 (Ut., 1983), has 
stated: 
"Thus, when a party opposes a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment and fails to file any responsive 
affidavits or other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 
56(e), the trial court may properly conclude that there are 
no genuine issues of fact unless the face of the movant's 
affidavit affirmatively discloses the existence of such an 
issue. Without such a showing, the Court need only decide 
whether, on the basis of the applicable law, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment. See Rule 56(c); Olwell v. 
Clark, Utah, 658 P.2d 585 (1982); Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 
Utah, 646 P.2d 678 (1982)." See also: LaPlante v. State, 
531 P2d 299 (Wash., 1975). 
In the LaPlante case, supra, it has been noted: 
"When a motion for summary judgment is supported by 
evidentiary matter, the adverse party may not rest on mere 
allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific 
facts that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Upon review of the granting of a motion for summary 
judgment, the Supreme Court of this State "applies the same 
standard as that applied by the trial court in determining the 
existence of material fact." See: Durham v. Margots, 571 P2d 1332 
(Ut., 1977); also, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The depositions given by the Plaintiff's officers or agents 
clearly indicate that the Defendant Mahmood made no representation 
concerning the value of the property involved, and further, the 
existence of the Earnest Money Agreement clearly revealed the 
relationship of Mahmood as one of the "Sellers" involved in the 
sale of the property in question, (Exhibit 3D, William Chipman 
deposition and Russell G. Hales deposition, pages 5-6.) 
The gravamen of the Plaintiff's claim is not that the 
Defendant Mahmood or the real estate agent involved made any 
misrepresentation or concealment of any material fact which lead to 
its damage, but rather that the appraisal conducted by the 
Defendant Jackman was the factor upon which they placed their 
reliance. Under those circumstances, we respectfully submit that 
the allegations of constructive fraud or misrepresentation totally 
fails and cannot be supported under any theory of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the factual background and the posture of the 
pleadings herein, we respectfully submit that the trial court acted 
entirely within the perameters of its discretionary power and that 
there has been no showing of an abuse of such authority and the 
summary judgment granted should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^<Tday of April, 1988. 
^^ Cttorngfy for Respondent Mahmood 
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